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EVIDENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, approximately January 1988 through July
1989, several evidence questions arose. The courts considered the admissibility of a telephone confession,' the relationship between a pre4
sumption and the burden of proof,2 self-authentication, 3 and hearsay.
In perhaps the most important case, State v. McCarty,5 the court enunciated a balancing test trial courts must apply before precluding testimony
as a sanction for failure to comply with rules of discovery.
II.

ADMISSIBILITY

Roybal,6

In State v.
the court of appeals considered the use of hearsay
during a preliminary determination of the admissibility of a telephone
confession and the foundational requirements for identifying the caller. 7
The defendant called the owner of a bicycle shop, confessed that he had
taken a bicycle from the shop, and offered to pay for the bicycle.'
During the conversation, the defendant gave the shop owner the telephone
number of his mother so that the owner could call and have her arrange
payment. 9
When the prosecution attempted to introduce the telephone conversation, the defense objected on foundational grounds because the owner
could not identify the voice he heard on the telephone as the defendant's. 0
The court sustained the objection." On rebuttal, the state made an offer
of proof, presenting the owner's testimony as to the conversation.' 2 To
establish a foundation for the testimony, the state called the investigating
officer, who testified that he had checked with the telephone company
on the number given by the caller and found that it belonged to a
member of the defendant's family. 3 Based on this foundation, the trial

1. State v. Roybal, 107 N.M. 309, 756 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 267, 755
P.2d 605 (1988). See infra notes 6-22 and accompanying text.
2. Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso v. Griego, 108 N.M. 240, 771 P.2d 173 (1989). See infra
notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
3. State v. Griffin, 108 N.M. 55, 766 P.2d 315 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 97, 766
P.2d 1331 (1988); Levy v. Disharoon, 106 N.M. 699, 749 P.2d 84 (1988). See infra notes 41-54
and accompanying text.
4. State v. Duran, 107 N.M. 603, 762 P.2d 890 (1988); State ex rel. Elec. Supply Co. v.
Kitchens Constr., 106 N.M. 753, 750 P.2d 114 (1988); Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, 106 N.M.
628, 747 P.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1987). See infra notes 55-105 and accompanying text.
5. 107 N.M. 651, 763 P.2d 360 (1988). See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
6. 107 N.M. 309, 756 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 267, 755 P.2d 605 (1988).
7. Id.at 310, 756 P.2d at 1205.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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court accepted the state's offer of proof and admitted the evidence. 4
The defendant contended that the trial court erred in admitting the
telephone confession as evidence when the only foundation for the confession was unsubstantiated hearsay. 5
The court first noted that the trial was conducted without a jury. In
a bench trial, the trial court is presumed to have disregarded improper
evidence, and erroneous admission of evidence is not reversible error
unless it appears the trial court must have relied on it in reaching its

decision. 16
Under evidentiary rule 11-104(A), preliminary questions, such as the
identity of the caller in Roybal, are determined by the trial judge. 1" When
the trial judge rules on a preliminary question, he or she is not bound
by the rules of evidence." In Bourjaily v. United States, 9 the United
States Supreme Court held that rule 104(a) authorizes the use of hearsay
in determining preliminary questions of admissibility. The trial judge
receives the hearsay evidence and gives it the weight his judgment and
20
experience dictate.
The New Mexico court also found that the investigating officer's
testimony was not the sole evidence establishing the defendant as the
caller. The caller provided facts of a personal nature from which the
court could properly have inferred that the caller was the defendant. 21
Finally the court pointed out that any error in the admission of this
evidence would not have been reversible error in any case because the
testimony was not vital to the state's case. Even where errors are of
constitutional dimension, reversal is 22not required where the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Cumming v. Nielson's, Inc.,23 the court of appeals considered whether
photographs showing the condition of a highway three weeks after an
accident were admissible under the "feasibility of precautionary measures"
exception to evidentiary rule 11-407.24 The plaintiff claimed the evidence

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing City of Roswell v. Gallegos, 77 N.M. 170, 420 P.2d 438 (1966); In re Doe, 89
N.M. 700, 556 P.2d 1176 (Ct. App. 1976)).
17. SUp. CT. RULEs ANN. 11-104 (Recomp. 1986) provides:
(A) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(B). In making this determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
18. Roybal, 107 N.M. at 311, 756 P.2d at 1206. See supra note 17.
19. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
20. Roybal, 107 N.M. at 311, 756 P.2d at 1206 (citing Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181 (quoting
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1974))).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 312, 756 P.2d 1207 (citing State v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982)).
23. 108 N.M. 198, 769 P.2d 732 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 97, 766 P.2d 1331 (1988).
24. SuP. CT. RUoEs ANN. 11-407 (Recomp. 1986) provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
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was admissible in this instance because it showed that a highway contractor
had completed the project "in the manner planned. ' 25 The court found
this irrelevant to any of the issues in the case, 26particularly to the condition
of the highway at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck head-on by a
vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver. 27 The highway on which the
accident occurred was under construction at the time, and Nielson's was
performing the work under contract with the State Highway Department. 28
The plaintiff sued the driver, several "dramshop defendants," Nielson's,
and the Highway Department. 29 At the initial trial, the plaintiff received
a judgment against the other driver. 30 The issues on appeal related only
to Nielson's and the other driver.3"
The plaintiff cited a number of cases in support of her contention
that subsequent remedial measures are admissible to show the feasibility
of precautionary measures in cases in which the defendant denies such
measures were feasible.3 2 The court held that because the contractor never
denied that precautionary measures were feasible, maintaining instead
that it had complied at all times with the specifications of the project,
the exception did not apply.33
Furthermore, the court found no merit in plaintiff's contention that
the exception applied because the photographs could be used to impeach
the testimony of Nielson's witnesses as to the condition of the highway
and structures on the night of the accident.3 4 The court did not see how
photographs taken three weeks after the accident could be relevant for
this purpose. 5
The second evidentiary issue the court addressed was the exclusion of
evidence of future medical treatment. Plaintiff sought to introduce, through
testimony of an expert medical witness, evidence of the necessity of future
medical treatment to her leg. The witness could not state with any medical
6
probability that such treatment would be necessary.

made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
25. Cumming, 108 N.M. at 204, 769 P.2d at 738.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 199, 769 P.2d at 733.
28. Id. at 200, 769 P.2d at 734.
29. Id. at 199, 769 P.2d at 733.
30. Id.
31. Id. After filing her notice of appeal, the plaintiff settled with the Highway Department and
the dramshop defendants. Id.
32. Id. at 204, 769 P.2d at 738.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 205, 769 P.2d at 739.
36. Id.
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The court held that evidence as to future medical treatment must be
stated in terms of medical probability.17 The witness in this case could
not state a medical probability that the plaintiff's leg would heal.3" He
could only state that the plaintiff might require surgery if the leg did
not heal.3 9 The court found the proffered testimony tantamount to saying
that the "plaintiff may require an operation," which is insufficient to
support an award of costs for a speculative operation. 40
III.

AUTHENTICATION

The court addressed the question of self-authentication of documents
in State v. Griffin,'41 a case involving an habitual offender proceeding.
The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and negligent use of
a deadly weapon and was charged in a supplemental information with
42
the commission of four prior felonies.
During the course of the hearing, several state's exhibits were introduced
into evidence as self-authenticating. These included the judgments and
sentences of prior convictions, a plea agreement on a prior involuntary
manslaughter conviction, fingerprint records, and photographs. 43 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the state's exhibits were not self-authenticating. 4
The court disagreed, holding that copies of official records are selfauthenticating under evidentiary rule 11-902(D) when they meet the requirement of certification by the custodian of the record in compliance
with evidentiary rule 11-902(A), (B), or (C). 4 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that certification pertaining to a prison records
manager requires the certification of the warden.4 The court stated that
rule 11-902(B) only requires that a public officer who has a seal and
official duties in the district or political subdivision of the signing officer
certify under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the
47
signature is genuine.
In Levy v. Disharoon,41 the plaintiff filed suit in equity seeking a
partnership accounting. During the course of the trial, a number of

37. Id. (citing Regenold v. Rutherford, 101 N.M. 165, 679 P.2d 833 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
107 N.M. 77, 678 P.2d 705 (1984)).
38. Id. at 205, 769 P.2d at 739.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Michael v. West, 76 N.M. 118, 121, 412 P.2d 549, 551 (1966)).
41. 108 N.M. 55, 766 P.2d 315 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 97, 766 P.2d 1331 (1988).
42. Id. at 56, 766 P.2d at 316.
43. Id. at 57, 766 P.2d at 317.
44. Id. at 59, 766 P.2d at 319.
45. Id. SuP. CT. RULEs ANN. 11-902(A) (Recomp. 1986) provides for self-authentication of
documents bearing a seal and a signature. Sup. CT. RULas ANN. 11-902(B) (Recomp. 1986) provides
for self-authentication of documents which are not under seal. SuP. CT. RutLs ANN. 11-902(C)
(Recomp. 1986), not applicable in this case, provides for authentication of foreign public documents.
46. Griffin, 108 N.M. at 59, 766 P.2d at 319. The authenticity of one document not under seal
was certified by the Secretary of State. Id.
47. Id.
48. 106 N.M. 699, 749 P.2d 84 (1988).
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letters, reports, sales agreements, and other documents maintained by the
aircraft title company involved in the purchase of the partnership's aircraft
were introduced into evidence.4 9 The custodian of the records did not
testify in court as to their trustworthiness.5 0
Under the hearsay exception provided by evidentiary rule 11-803(E),
records kept in a regularly conducted activity are admissible if the custodian of the records or other qualified witness appears in court to
identify them and to testify as to the mode of their preparation and
safekeeping." On appeal, Levy maintained that the records in question
did not need to be authenticated by a custodian as a condition of admission
because they were self-authenticating under evidentiary rule 11-902.12 The
court disagreed, holding that the records in question did not fall within
the narrow exception of self-authenticating documents and should not
have been admitted without a proper foundation." Nonetheless, there
was no reversible error, since the facts established by the improperly
4
admitted evidence were supported by other competent evidence.
IV. HEARSAY
In State v. Duran," the supreme court considered a prosecutor's attempt
to introduce otherwise inadmissible statements in the guise of impeaching
his own witness with a prior inconsistent statement. The defense alleged
that the prosecution called a defense alibi witness during its case-in-chief
only to elicit prior inconsistent statements made by her regarding a
conversation with the defendant. The defense characterized this as a
56
subterfuge designed to avoid the hearsay rule.
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery.
On appeal, he claimed that he was denied the right to a fair trial because
the prosecution shifted the burden of proof in trying to prove his guilt
by showing he had no alibi.5 7 The prosecution called a potential defense

49. Id. at 705, 749 P.2d at 90.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1976), overruled on other
grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982)).
52. SuP. CT. Rum ANN. 11-902 (Recomp. 1986) provides that extrinsic evidence of authenticity
as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Domestic public documents under seal.
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal.
(3) Foreign public documents.
(4) Certified copies of public records.
(5) Official Publications.
(6) Newspapers and periodicals.
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like.
(8) Acknowledged documents.
(9) Commercial paper and related documents.
(10) Presumptions under Acts of Congress.
It is not clear which subsection Levy intended to invoke.
53. Levy, 106 N.M. at 705, 749 P.2d at 90.
54. Id.
55. 107 N.M. 603, 762 P.2d 890 (1988).
56. Id. at 606, 762 P.2d at 893.
57. Id. at 605-06, 762 P.2d at 892-93.
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alibi witness and tried to impeach her by showing she was partial to the
defendant.5 8 In the process, the prosecution also elicited a statement from
the witness that the defendant allegedly made to her.5 9
Under New Mexico law, the credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling himA° Hearsay is "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ' ' 6'
A prior statement by a witness who testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement is 62not hearsay
if the statement is inconsistent with the witness' testimony.
In this case, the witness, Rose Montoya, gave a prior statement to the
police when she answered the question, "Did [the defendant] ask you
to tell the police that you drove him to the Mills?" She replied, "He
said that I was his only alibi." ' 63 At trial, the prosecution asked the
witness, "Did the defendant tell you to tell the story about driving him
to the Mills' house?" The trial transcript shows
that the prosecutor's
65
purpose was to impeach the witness' credibility.
The supreme court held that the witness' statement to the police was
not hearsay because she testified at trial and was subject to crossexamination regarding the statement. 6 However, her prior statement contained a statement by the defendant which was hearsay.67 Since the
defendant never testified, the statement allegedly attributed to him by
Montoya in her prior statement could not be used as substantive evidence
6
against him.
The court held that the validity of Montoya's prior statement could
be used to impeach her credibility at trial, but the hearsay content of
what defendant had purportedly said to her should have been excised
or inadmissible because it did not fall within any exception to the hearsay
69
rule.
In addition to finding the admission of defendant's hearsay statement
made to Montoya to be constitutionally improper, the court also held
that the prosecution's calling of Montoya in its case-in-chief for the
purpose of impeachment was improper. 70 The prosecution had elicited
only evidence from Montoya which was cumulative and consistent with

58. Id. at 606, 762 P.2d at 893.
59. Id. at 606-09, 762 P.2d at 893-96.
60. SuP. CT. RULES ANN. 11-607 (Recomp. 1986).
61. SuP. CT. RuLEs ANN. 11-801(C) (Recomp. 1986).
62. SuP. CT. RULEs ANN. 1I-801(D)(1) (Recomp. 1986).
63. Duran, 107 N.M. at 606, 762 P.2d at 893.
64. Id. The court noted that the question was not only leading but also misleading in its
characterization of Montoya's prior statement. Id.
65. Id. at 606, 762 P.2d at 893.
66. Id. at 608, 762 P.2d at 895.
67. Id. See supra text accompanying note 63.
68. Id. at 608, 762 P.2d at 895.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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her prior statement. 7 Impeachment would be proper only after the defendant had presented his alibi, thereby allowing the state to impeach
the alibi witness. 72 Nonetheless, the court declined to say 3the impropriety
prejudiced the defendant and found no reversible error.
In State ex rel. Electric Supply Co. v. Kitchens Construction,7 4 the
supreme court addressed the question of the admissibility of computerized
business records under the hearsay exception provided by evidentiary rule
11-803. This case involved a suit filed by Electric Supply Co., Inc. (ESCO)
against Kitchens Construction (Kitchens) to recover the cost of certain
materials ESCO had supplied
to Klein Electric Company (Klein), a sub75
contractor of Kitchens.
At trial, ESCO introduced into evidence computer-generated invoices
and picking lists for the materials at issue which had been supplied to
Klein. At the time of shipment, the picking lists had been entered into
the ESCO's computer data base.7 6 The information in the data base was
then used to generate invoices.77 The invoices introduced into evidence
by ESCO were similar to the original invoices, but they were produced
for the trial
and differed somewhat in format from those originally sent
7

to Klein .

Kitchens claimed that the invoices were inadmissible under evidentiary
rules 11-803 and 11-1001 through 1003, because they were produced for
the litigation and were generated from data different from the data used
for the original invoices. 79 Kitchens contended that under the best evidence

71. Id. at 609, 762 P.2d at 896.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 608-09, 792 P.2d at 895-96. In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the
harmless error standard for evaluating appeals involving constitutional errors established in Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under Chapman, unless the beneficiary of the error can show
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,
the conviction must be reversed." Id. at 24. Under the federal rule, the state would have the burden
of proving harmless error. Id. In Duran, the court found there was "sufficient evidence to convict
the defendant." 107 N.M. at 609, 762 P.2d at 896. While the implication is that the court's finding
meets this standard, it is at least arguable that the two are not the same and that the Chapman
standard is higher.
74. 106 N.M. 753, 750 P.2d 114 (1988).
75. The suit was filed under the Little Miller Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-19 (Repl. Pamp.
1985), which was intended to protect suppliers of materials under any subcontract involving state
construction projects. State ex rel. Electric Supply Co., 106 N.M. at 755, 750 P.2d at 116.
76. Id. at 754, 750 P.2d at 115.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 754-55, 750 P.2d at 115-16. The original invoices were described by catalogue number;
the invoices introduced at trial described items by brand name. Id. Kitchens complained that Electric
Supply Co. offered no testimony correlating the numbers and brand names. Id.
79. Id. at 754-56, 750 P.2d at 115-17. SUP. CT. RULES ANN. 11-803(F) (Recomp. 1986) provides
a hearsay exception to records of a regularly conducted activity
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the [record], all as
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness.
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rule either the original invoices or their duplicates should have been
offered, o
The court disagreed, pointing out that under rule 803(F) computer data
compilations may be construed as business records themselves and should
be treated as any other record of a regularly conducted activity."' If the
data on which a computer printout is based were stored and compiled
at the time of the underlying transactions, it is admissible, even though
the printout is produced at a subsequent date. 82 If entries to the database
were made in the regular course of business for business purposes, there
is no need to produce the original files."3 As long as the custodian of
the records or any other qualified person testifies about the foundational
requirements, the records are admissible. A qualified person, as established
by State v. Ruiz,8 4 is one capable of testifying to the manner of preparation
of the records and their safekeeping. Finally, the court pointed out that
evidentiary rule 11-1001(C) provides that a computerized data compilation
or printout is an original record.85
In this case, the court held that the invoices did not appear to have
been produced in anticipation of litigation, but were generated from an
86
already existing data base made at the time of the parties' relationship.
Two witnesses, presumably familiar with the manner of preparation and
safekeeping of the data compilation, testified to the procedure used to
prepare the records. 7
The court of appeals addressed the general definition of hearsay in
Zamora v. Creamland Dairies.8s Creamland Dairies had received information that someone was making unauthorized sales of milk at a residence
in Albuquerque. 9 The dairy hired a private investigator, Caristo, to
investigate the allegations. 90 During his surveillance, Caristo observed
Zamora, a Creamland route driver, loading ten cases of Creamland milk
at a market into a truck owned by the owners of the house and unloading
them at the house. 9' Caristo prepared a report of the investigation and
included photographs implicating Zamora. 92 During this period, Creamland's manager was informed by another employee that Zamora had been
disposing of Creamland products improperly. 93

80. State ex rel. Elec. Supply Co., 106 N.M. at 754-56, 750 P.2d at 115-17.
81. Id. at 756, 750 P.2d at 117 (citing Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1980)).
82. Id. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. B.L. Allen, Inc., 138 Vt. 84, 100, 413 A.2d
122, 132 (1980)).
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. 94 N.M. 721, 725, 617 P.2d 160, 164 (Ct. App. 1980).
85. State ex rel. Electric Supply Co., 106 N.M. at 756, 750 P.2d at 117.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 106 N.M. 628, 747 P.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1987). For a discussion of the substantive issues in
this case, see Survey, Torts, 20 N.M.L. Rsv. 431-32 (1990) (this issue).
89. Id. at 630, 747 P.2d at 925.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The manager confronted Zamora with the information and asked him
to take a stress analyzer test which he failed. 94 At that point the manager
directed Caristo to turn the results of his investigation over to the
appropriate law enforcement officials. 9
Caristo contacted the Second Judicial District Attorney who informed
him that he would have to report the matter to the Albuquerque Police
Department before the district attorney could act. 96 Caristo submitted a
summary of his investigation and filled out an Offense and Incident
Report. 97 Zamora was indicted and brought to trial.98 At the trial, after
the close of the state's case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor
of Zamora, who then filed suit for malicious prosecution against the
defendants. 99 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.' °° Zamora appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.' 0'
One of the issues raised during the appeal was whether the trial court
should have stricken, in whole or in part, affidavits submitted by the
defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment. Zamora
first argued that the affidavits submitted by Creamland's manager, Finch,
were based on hearsay.' 2 The court of appeals disagreed. The affidavits
were introduced not to prove the truth of the assertion that Zamora had
engaged in the conduct reported to Finch, but rather to show that Finch
had probable cause to believe that Zamora had committed those acts,
and Finch therefore acted reasonably in directing Caristo to report the
results of his investigation to the authorities. 03 Thus Finch's statements
did not fall within the definition of hearsay contained in evidentiary rule
11-801(C).104 The court also noted that even hearsay may be used to
establish probable cause. 05
V.

PRECLUSION OF TESTIMONY AS A SANCTION FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY RULES

In McCarty v. State,1°6 the supreme court granted certiorari to decide
whether it was proper to preclude the testimony of a defense witness as

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631, 747 P.2d at 926.
Id.
Id. at 630, 747 P.2d at 925.

101. Id.

102. Id. at 631, 747 P.2d at 927. SuP. CT. Ruis ANN. 1-056(E) (Recomp. 1986) states in part:
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made of personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein."
103. Zamora, 106 N.M. at 631-32, 747 P.2d at 926-27.
104. SuP. CT. Rtrus ANN. 11-801 (Recomp. 1986) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."
105. Zamora, 106 N.M. at 632, 747 P.2d at 927 (citing Seelig v. Harvard Coop. Soc'y, 355
Mass. 532, 246 N.E.2d 642 (1969) and State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782 (1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 976 (1967)).
106. 107 N.M. 651, 763 P.2d 360 (1988).
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a sanction for failure to comply with a prosecution demand for notice
of alibi. 10
Upon demand a defendant intending to offer evidence of an alibi in
his defense must inform the district attorney of his intention in writing
at least ten days prior to the start of the trial.' 08 In McCarty, the state
filed a demand for notice of alibi. '1 9 The defense did not submit a notice
of alibi, but filed a witness list containing the names and addresses of
two witnesses without identifying them as alibi witnesses." 0 When the
defense sought to have these witnesses testify at trial as to the defendant's
whereabouts during the hours immediately preceding the crime, the trial
court ruled this was evidence of an alibi and refused to permit the
testimony."
To resolve the issue of whether preclusion of the testimony was an
appropriate sanction for violation of the discovery rule, the court adopted
a test which balances "the potential for prejudice to the prosecution
against the impact on the defense. 1" 2 The test also considers whether
the evidence was material to the verdict" 3 and whether preclusion would
protect the adversary system and be in the interest of the "fair and
efficient administration of justice.""14 The trial court should consider
four specific factors: (1) the effectiveness of less severe sanctions; (2) the
impact of preclusion on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the
case; (3) the extent of prosecutorial surprise or prejudice; and (4) whether
the violation was willful." 5 The court cautioned that before a trial judge
exercises his discretion to preclude testimony, he must weigh these factors6
to avoid violating the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial."
In this case, the impact on the case was significant because the jury
was denied a chance to hear testimony that the defendant was elsewhere
at a time when the state's key witness testified the defendant was casing
the store later burglarized. " 7 Second, the prosecution was not unduly
surprised or prejudiced since the defense listed only two witnesses, both

107. Id. at 651, 763 P.2d at 360.
108. Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 5-508 (Recomp. 1986) provides:
[U]pon the written demand of the district attorney ... a defendant who intends
to offer evidence of an alibi in his defense shall, not less than ten (10) days before
trial or such other time as the district court may direct, serve upon such district
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim such alibi. Such notice shall
contain specific information as to the place at which the defendant claims to have
been at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly as known to the
defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he
proposes to establish such alibi.
109. McCarty, 107 N.M. at 651, 763 P.2d at 360.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 652, 763 P.2d at 361.
112. Id. at 653, 763 P.2d at 362 (citing Escalera v. Coombe, 826 F.2d 185, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1987),
vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1004 (1988)).
113. Id.(citing Escalera, 826 F.2d at 189-91).
114. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 655, 763 P.2d at 364. The McCarty test appears to apply to other discovery violations
as well. See Manlove v. Sullivan, 108 N.M. 471, 476, 775 P.2d 237, 243 (1989).
117. Id. at 654, 763 P.2d at 363.
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of whom the prosecution had interviewed."' Third, McCarty's counsel's
actions were not clearly willful or used to gain tactical advantage." 9
Further, the court stated that neither the purpose nor the intent of the
notice-of-alibi rule was frustrated in this case and the exclusion of the
20
evidence was an abuse of discretion on the part 2of the trial judge.
The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.' '
VI.

PRESUMPTIONS

In Mortgage Investment Co. of El Paso v. Griego,2 2 a key issue was
the operation of a presumption under New Mexico law. A mortgage
investment company loan officer was shot to death in his office during
business hours. 123 His widow's workers' compensation death benefits were
terminated by the employer after the apprehension and conviction of the
party responsible for the death. 24 The employer alleged that the killing
was not work-related. 25 The decedent's widow sued for reinstatement of
the benefit which hinged on a determination that the death arose out
126
of and was incident to his employment.
After a bench trial, the trial court found that neither side had produced
sufficient credible evidence for the court to determine whether the death
was work-related. 27 The court, therefore, declined to reinstate the widow's
benefits and denied reimbursement for benefits paid. 28 The court of
appeals reversed, basing its decision on Ensley v. Grace 29 which held
that when death occurs at work and the cause of death is unknown and
unexplained the claimant is entitled to a presumption that death arose
out of the employment. 3 0 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals
131
and affirmed the trial court.
Until the adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 1973, courts followed
the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions. 3 2 Under this rule, a
presumption "ceases to exist upon the introduction of evidence which
would support a finding of its nonexistence.' ' 3 This gave way in 1973
to evidentiary rule 301 which provided that "a presumption imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the
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130.
131.
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133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 654-55, 763 P.2d at 363-64.
Id. at 655, 763 P.2d at 364.
108 N.M. 240, 771 P.2d 173 (1989).
Id. at 241, 771 P.2d at 174.
Id. at 242, 771 P.2d at 175.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966).
Mortgage Inv. Co., 108 N.M. at 242, 771 P.2d at 175.
Id.
Id.at 243, 771 P.2d at 176.
Id. (citing Trujillo v. Chavez, 93 N.M. 489, 492, 601 P.2d 736, 739 (Ct. App. 1979)).
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nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence."' 3 4
Under this rule, the presumption may still be considered as persuasive
proof, even after the introduction of evidence to the contrary.",
In 1980, the rule was amended to eliminate the shift in the burden
of persuasion. Rule 301 now reads:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to
rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally

cast. 136

In this case, the trial judge found that the employer failed to rebut
3
the presumption that the death arose out of the victim's employment.1 1
As the factfinder, he could have accepted the presumption as sufficient
proof to support the claimant's contention.' 38 However, he was not
required to accept it as such. 139 The supreme court held that the trial
judge correctly determined the claimant failed to meet her burden of
persuasion that the death was work-related.' 40
DENNIS S. HAZLETT
HENRICK A. ROEHNERT
RALPH E. TRUJILLO, Ed.

134. Id. (citing State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran, 93 N.M. 489, 492, 601 P.2d 722, 725 (Ct.
App. 1979).
135. Id.
136. Sup. CT. RULES ANN. 11-301 (Recomp. 1986) (formerly N.M. STAT. ANN. RuILE oF EVmENCE
301 (1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1983)).
137. Mortgage Inv. Co., 108 N.M. at 244, 771 P.2d at 177.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 244-45, 771 P.2d at 177-78.

